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Abstract 
Costa Rica pioneered the use of the payments for environmental services (PES) approach 
in developing countries by establishing a formal, country-wide program of payments, the PSA 
program. The PSA program has worked hard to develop mechanisms to charge the users of 
environmental services for the services they receive. It has made substantial progress in charging 
water users, and more limited progress in charging biodiversity and carbon sequestration users. 
Because of the way it makes payments to service providers (using approaches largely inherited 
from earlier programs), however, the PSA program has considerable room for improvement in 
the efficiency with which it generates environmental services. With experience, many of these 
weaknesses are being gradually corrected as the PSA program evolves towards a much more 
targeted and differentiated program. An important lesson is the need to be flexible and to adapt 
to lessons learned and to changing circumstances. 
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Introduction 
Costa Rica pioneered the use of payments for environmental services (PES) in 
developing countries by establishing a formal, country-wide program of payments (Pago por 
Servicios Ambientales, PSA). The PSA program has been partly credited for helping the country, 
once known as having one of the world’s highest deforestation rates, to achieve negative net 
deforestation in the early 2000s. Several other countries in the region have been watching this 
experience closely, and many are developing similar programs. 
This paper examines the experience of Costa Rica’s PSA program. The program’s 
development is described in the first part of the paper. The second part assesses its effectiveness, 
based on currently-available evidence. 
Costa Rica’s PSA program 
Beginning in 1997, Costa Rica developed an elaborate PES program (Castro et al., 1997; 
Chomitz et al., 1999; FONAFIFO, 2000, 2005). Forest Law No.7575, enacted in 1996, explicitly 
recognized four environmental services provided by forest ecosystems: (i) mitigation of 
greenhouse gas emissions; (ii) hydrological services, including provision of water for human 
consumption, irrigation, and energy production; (iii) biodiversity conservation; and (iv) provision 
of scenic beauty for recreation and ecotourism. The law provides the regulatory basis to contract 
landowners for the services provided by their lands, and establishes the National Fund for Forest 
Financing (Fondo Nacional de Financiamento Forestal, FONAFIFO). 
The PSA program did not start from a blank slate. Beginning in the 1970s, concern over 
dwindling timber supplies led Costa Rica to provide incentives for timber plantations, initially 
through tax rebates. The Forest Credit Certificate (Certificado de Abono Forestal, CAF), created 
in 1986, broadened participation, which had previously been limited to larger companies with 
significant tax liabilities. Several variants of the CAF were introduced over the years. The 
introduction of the Forest Protection Certificate (Certificado para la Protección del Bosque, 
CPB) in 1995 was particularly significant, as it supported forest conservation rather than timber 
production. Over 150,000 ha received financing through the old system.
1
When the PSA program was created, therefore, Costa Rica already had in place a system 
of payments for reforestation and forest management, and the institutions to manage it. The 
Forest Law built on this base, with two major changes. First, it changed the justification for 
payments from support for the timber industry to the provision of environmental services. 
Second, it changed the source of financing from the government budget to an earmarked tax and 
payments from beneficiaries. In other respects, the PSA program was very similar to previous 
forest sector incentives. Until 2000, the activities financed under the PSA program closely 
paralleled those financed by previous instruments: timber plantations, sustainable forest 
management, and forest conservation. Many details of implementation, such as payment amounts 
and scheduling, were also carried over from earlier programs. Indeed, at first CAF certificates 
were used to pay PSA program participants.  
                                                 
1   All figures for which no specific source is indicated were provided by FONAFIFO.    3  
Over the years, the PSA program has evolved considerably. In 2000, the array of 
instruments was simplified to only two: timber plantations
2 and forest conservation
3. An 
agroforestry contract was introduced in 2004, and a natural regeneration contract is being 
introduced. Initially completely untargeted, the PSA program is moving towards a greater degree 
of targeting. On the demand side, FONAFIFO has secured agreements with many water users to 
pay for watershed conservation, and developed streamlined instruments to facilitate this. It was 
an early entrant in the global carbon market.  
The PSA Program is managed by FONAFIFO, a semi-autonomous agency with 
independent legal status. FONAFIFO’s governing board is composed of three representatives of 
the public sector (one each from the Ministry of Environment and Energy, the Ministry of 
Agriculture, and the National Banking System) and two representatives from the private forest 
sector (appointed by the board of directors of the National Forestry Office). FONAFIFO’s status 
gives it a relative degree of autonomy in making personnel decisions and in managing funds, but 
it remains subject to a variety of governmental restrictions. Its budget must be approved by the 
Ministry of Finance, while payment levels and priorities are set annually be executive decree. 
Delays in these administrative procedures have often hampered FONAFIFO’s work.  
Who pays for the PSA program? 
To date, the bulk of PSA program financing has been obtained by allocating to 
FONAFIFO 3.5% of the revenues from a fossil fuel sales tax (about US$10 million a year).
4 
From 2001 to 2006, the PSA program was supported by a loan from the World Bank and a grant 
from the Global Environment Facility (GEF), through the Ecomarkets Project. A new project, 
Mainstreaming Market Based Instruments for Environmental Management (MMBIEM), will 
continue supporting the program from 2007.
5 The PSA Program has also received a grant from 
German aid agency KfW through the Huetar Norte Forest Program.
6 Efforts have also been 
made to charge various service users for the services they are receiving. Ultimately, it is 
envisaged that all beneficiaries of environmental services would pay for the services they 
receive. As discussed below, this objective has been met only partially to date, though progress is 
being made. 
                                                 
2   This contract is called a ‘reforestation’ contract by FONAFIFO, but is intended to produce commercial timber 
plantations. To avoid confusion over its intent, it will be called the ‘timber plantation’ contract herein. The 
distinction is also important because, by law, critical areas such as steep slopes and riparian zones cannot be 
exploited commercially. These areas, therefore, are not eligible for the ‘reforestation’ contract. 
3   The forest conservation contract is also often refered to as the ‘forest protection’ contract. 
4   Initially, the PSA program was to receive one third of fuel tax revenues, but conflicts with the Ministry of 
Finance meant that only a small and variable part of these funds were actually received (FONAFIFO, 2000). 
Subsequently, Fiscal Reform Law No.8114 of 2001 reduced FONAFIFO’s share of fuel tax revenues to 3.5%, 
but guaranteed this amount.  
5   In both the Ecomarkets and the MMBIEM Projects, the GEF grants represent additional resources for the PSA 
program, but the Bank loans do not. As discussed below, the GEF grants can be considered payments from 
biodiversity users. 
6   The EUR10.2 million (US$11.9 million at the 2003 exchange rate) grant was received in 2003, but was made 
retroactive to 1999 by reimbursing FONAFIFO for earlier contracts it had entered into in anticipation of 
receiving the grant. This grant is essentially a traditional aid/development grant, which is implemented through 
the PSA program (an existing mechanism and a trustworthy institution up-and-running in the receiving 
country), rather than a conscious effort to pay for environmental services (G. Mes, pers. comm., 2005).    4  
Water service payments 
Forest Law No.7575 explicitly recognized the role of forests in providing hydrological 
services. Payments from hydropower producers and other water users were always envisaged as 
one of the legs on which the PSA program would stand. Law No.7575 does not obligate 
beneficiaries to pay for services, however. Any payments must be negotiated with potential 
service buyers. FONAFIFO has dedicated substantial efforts to negotiating with water users for 
them to pay for the water services they receive and has reached a number of agreements (Table 
1).  
A first agreement, with hydropower producer Energía Global, was reached in late 1997 
with the assistance of FUNDECOR, an environmental NGO. Under this agreement, Energía 
Global contributes to payments made to participating land users in the watersheds above the 
company’s two run-of-the-river powerplants. Similar agreements were reached a year later with 
other hydropower producers, including state power producer Compañia Nacional de Fuerza y 
Luz (CNFL).  
After a slow start, the number of financing agreements with water users rose sharply, 
helped by the development of a streamlined process based on environmental services certificates 
(Certificados de Servicios Ambientales, CSA) which are standardized instruments that pay for 
the conservation of one hectare of forest in a specified area. Rather than negotiating each 
agreement on an ad hoc basis, FONAFIFO can sell interested water users the appropriate number 
of certificates. Recent agreements include bottlers, municipal water supply systems, irrigation 
water users, and hotels. The amounts paid have also risen: early agreements saw water users 
paying for a quarter of conservation costs (based on the notion that water services are one of four 
services that the law said forests provide), while recent agreements involve water users paying 
the entire cost of conservation, as well as covering FONAFIFO’s administrative costs. 
Agreements with water users are typically for five years.  
In 2005, Costa Rica expanded the use of water payments by revising its water tariff 
(which previously charged water users near-zero nominal fees
7) and introducing a conservation 
fee earmarked for watershed conservation. Once fully implemented, this fee will generate an 
estimated US$19 million annually, of which 25% (about US$5 million) would be channeled 
through the PSA program, the balance being allocated to the Ministry of Environment and 
Energy’s Water Department (50%) and to protected areas (25%) (Fallas, 2006). This new tariff 
was instituted by Presidential decree, and will be embedded in a new Water Law which is under 
consideration in the National Assembly. 
The water tariff represents a shift from voluntary agreements to compulsory ones. It will 
result in a rapid and substantial increase in the amount of funding available for conservation. 
After five years of efforts, voluntary agreements generated about US$0.5 million annually. In a 
similar time period, the water tariff is likely to generate ten times the amount.  
The move to compulsory payments has an important downside, however. In addition to 
funds, payments made under voluntary agreements, also generate information—on which areas 
are important for water supply, and on what kinds of services need to be protected. Voluntary 
agreements also contain an explicit feedback loop, as water users can withhold payment if they 
                                                 
7   The discussion here centers on the fees that holders of water use permits pay to the government for the right to 
extract or use water, not to the fees paid by consumers. Hydropower producers, for example, paid 0.001 
centavos/m
3 under the previous tariff.    5  
do not receive the desired services. Neither of these desirable characteristics is present in the case 
of compulsory payments such as those mandated by the new water tariff. As fees are uniform 
nationwide (for a given type of user), prioritization must depend on FONAFIFO undertaking its 
own studies of conservation needs—and getting them right. And as payment of fees is 
compulsory, water users have no leverage to request changes if the program fails to improve 
water services. 
Several features of the Costa Rican water tariff help reduce the extent of these problems. 
First, revenue from the tariff must be used in the watershed within which it is generated, and to 
benefit water users. This helps ensure that resources are used where water needs are greatest. 
Second, water users can deduct any direct payments to FONAFIFO from the amounts due under 
the water tariff.
8 This ensures that water users do not pay twice for conservation, once through 
the voluntary agreement and once through the tariff. In fact, this feature may result in an increase 
in voluntary agreements. By paying FONAFIFO directly, water users can ensure that their 
payments go to agreed purposes, rather than leaving the choice of activities entirely up to 
FONAFIFO. 
Biodiversity payments 
The Ecomarkets Project included a US$8 million grant from GEF, which can be 
considered a payment from the global community for the biodiversity services provided by Costa 
Rica’s forests. US$5 million of this grant were used to make payments in biodiversity priority 
areas and the balance for institutional strengthening. Another GEF grant, for the Costa Rica 
component of the Regional Integrated Silvopastoral Ecosystem Management Project, is also 
channeled through the PSA program (Pagiola et al., 2004, Ibrahim et al., 2006). This project 
aims to generate both biodiversity conservation and carbon sequestration benefits by using a PES 
mechanism to encourage the conversion of extensive pastures to silvopastoral land uses. The 
recently approved MMBIEM Project includes a further US$10 million grant from GEF. 
Conservation International (CI) is also paying for biodiversity conservation through the PSA 
Program, by providing US$0.5 million to pay 50% of the cost of agroforestry contracts in the 
Osa and Amistad Pacifico conservation areas; and by paying 50% of the costs of planting up to 
80,000 trees under agroforestry contracts in the buffer zone of Chirripó National Park.  
Unlike agreements with water users, these agreements are not intended to be renewable. 
Efforts to generate financing from the local tourism industry to conserve the indirect benefits of 
natural ecosystems have not yet borne fruit.
9 This creates a challenge for funding long-term 
payments to service providers in areas where neither water nor carbon payments are available. 
Within the 1.4 million ha of biodiversity priority conservation areas outside the protected areas, 
about 0.2 million ha have significant potential for carbon financing, and about 0.3 million ha 
have significant potential for water financing, leaving about 0.9 million ha that do not have 
potential for either water or carbon financing. An endowment fund is being established to 
provide a partial answer to the challenge of funding long-term payments for conservation in this 
area (Pagiola et al., 2006).   
                                                 
8   This feature means that the net increase in resources available to FONAFIFO will be less than US$5 million, as 
part of the roughly US$0.5 million that FONAFIFO already receives from water users will count against that. 
However, water users who are currently paying more than the tariff would require them to have signalled their 
intention to maintain the higher payment levels. 
9   Several hotels are paying for watershed conservation (see Table 1), but they are doing so to protect their water 
supplies, not to preserve biodiversity.    6  
Carbon payments 
Fuel tax revenues can arguably be considered a payment from Costa Rican carbon users 
for the carbon sequestration benefits provided by the PSA Program. As with  
From the beginning, Costa Rica’s PSA program has also sought to sell carbon emission 
reduction credits. PSA contracts specify that the rights to any resulting emissions reductions 
belong to FONAFIFO. To sell these emissions reductions, FONAFIFO developed a standardized 
instrument, the Certifiable Tradeable Offset (CTO), which represented an externally certified 1-
tonne net reduction in carbon emissions (Castro et al., 1997; OCIC, 1999). The program got an 
early boost when the Norwegian Government and a consortium of Norwegian power producers 
paid US$2 million for 200,000 CTOs. Under the agreement reached in Bonn in July 2001, 
however, only reforestation and afforestation are considered eligible under the Kyoto Protocol’s 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). As most of Costa Rica’s emission reductions are 
generated by avoided deforestation rather than reforestation, no additional sales of CTOs were 
made. 
With the Kyoto Protocol now ratified, Costa Rica is returning to the carbon market. A 
first contract, with the World Bank’s BioCarbon Fund, covers the sale of about 0.61 million 
tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalents (tCO2e) by 2017. This will be achieved through a mix of 
planting trees in agroforestry systems, natural regeneration, and commercial plantations. 
FONAFIFO is also exploring the potential for ‘retail’ (non-Kyoto) sales of emissions reduction. 
Already it has sold emission reductions from conservation of 100ha of forests in Talamanca to 
Italian firm Lifegate, in a deal arranged with the assistance of an Italian NGO, GEV-Modena.  
To help provide Kyoto-eligible carbon emissions reductions, FONAFIFO is introducing a 
new ‘assisted natural regeneration’ contract. This contract is meant to be less costly to implement 
than the timber plantation contract, which also produces Kyoto-eligible emissions reductions but 
has proven to be insufficiently attractive financially for many land users. 
Landscape payments 
The Forest Law mentions scenic beauty as one of the environmental services provided by 
forests. Negotiations were undertaken with several ‘users’, including hotels and a rafting 
company, to pay for this service, but they did not result in any agreements. Unlike water 
services, where there often is a single dominant user in a given watershed, the ‘users’ of 
landscape services tend to be many and fragmented, thus creating problems of collective action 
in securing payments. 
Summary 
Overall, the PSA program is only partly financed by payments from service users. The 
bulk of its financing is from the fuel tax, which can only tenuously be regarded as a payment by 
service users. The PSA Program thus remains largely a “supply side” PES Program (Pagiola and 
Platais, forthcoming).  
Although some progress has been made towards securing financing from service users, 
most users are not paying for the services they receive. This includes many water users, as well 
as the tourism industry, despite its profiting handsomely from Costa Rica’s reputation as a 
“Green Country”.
10 Initially, the reluctance of most service users to pay for conservation could 
have been ascribed to lack of familiarity with the PES approach. With the PSA Program now 
                                                 
10   Many tourism operators benefit directly from the PSA Program by receiving payments for their forest holdings.     7  
well established, well-known within Costa Rica, and widely perceived as being very successful, 
resistance to payments is most likely due to a desire to free ride on the efforts of the government 
and other users. This is particularly likely to be true where multiple water users share the same 
watershed, or in the case of tourism industry, which is highly fragmented. It is noteworthy that 
all current payment agreements with water users are in watersheds where there is a single 
dominant user (Pagiola, 2002).
11 Moreover, some aspects of current PSA Program policies tend 
to discourage user payments. In the absence of direct agreements, users can count on some 
degree of conservation of their areas of interest through the payments made possible by 
government financing. When a direct agreement is reached, however, FONAFIFO generally 
charges all conservation payments in the area of interest to the user, which effectively increases 
the net cost of any incremental conservation (Tattenbach, pers. comm., 2005). 
The proportion of the program financed by direct payments is set to increase dramatically 
as the new water tariff is implemented. Although this latter payment is not voluntary, it has 
features which help it retain some of the desirable characteristics of voluntary payments. 
The program’s own costs are financed from a levy of 7% of the flow of funds it handles, 
an amount that is fixed by law. In addition, however, some transaction costs are borne by 
participating land users.  
How are service providers paid? 
The PSA program targets private land users, with the aim of integrating environmental 
considerations in landscapes outside protected areas.
12 Landowners were initially contracted by 
the national conservation area system (Sistema Nacional de Areas de Conservación, SINAC) and 
by NGOs such as FUNDECOR. FONAFIFO took over this task in 2003, establishing eight 
regional offices to handle applications, sign contracts, and monitor implementation.  
To participate, landowners must present a sustainable forest management plan prepared 
by a licensed forester (‘regente’). These plans describe the proposed land use, and include 
information on land tenure and physical access; topography, soils, climate, drainage, actual land 
use, and carrying capacity with respect to land use; plans for preventing forest fires, illegal 
hunting, and illegal harvesting; and monitoring schedules.
13 Once their plans have been 
approved, landowners begin adopting the specified practices, and receive payments. The initial 
payment can be requested at contract signing, but subsequent annual payments are made after 
verification of compliance (by the regentes, with a sample being audited).  
Payment amounts were inherited from the earlier CAF system. For the forest 
conservation contract, they were about US$43/ha/year, while the timber plantation contract paid 
US$550/ha over five years.
14 Substantial increases in payment levels were announced in 2006, in 
the midst of a presidential election. Payments for forest conservation increased to 
                                                 
11   The sole exception to this is the Río Segundo watershed, where Florida Ice & Farm and the town of Heredia 
both contribute to conservation payments, as discussed below.  
12   Private landowners in protected areas who have not yet been compensated for their lands are also eligible to 
participate in the PSA program. At the end of 2005, contracts with such landowners covered 38,700ha. 
13   Applicants must also comply with a variety of other conditions, such as not being in arrears with social security 
payments. 
14   Payment amounts are set annually, typically by adjusting the previous amounts for inflation. Annual payments 
for forest conservation thus gradually increased from US$40/ha in 1997 to US$43 in 2005. To reduce the 
impact of inflation, contracts are now denominated in US dollars rather than Costa Rican colones.     8  
US$64/ha/year, and for plantations to US$816/ha over 10 years. Coming well before new 
funding sources are scheduled to be available, these increases are forcing a substantial reduction 
in area contracted. The net value of the payment is lower than its face value, as landowners must 
pay the regentes for the initial management plan and for monitoring; these fees take about 15% 
of payments. Complying with the provisions of their management plans (such as building 
firebreaks) further reduces the net value of payments. Payments offered under each contract are 
the same everywhere in the country.
15
Forest conservation contracts provide for equal annual payments over the five year 
lifetime of the contract. These contracts are renewable by mutual agreement. In contrast, timber 
plantation contracts front-load most of the payment into the early years of the contract: 50% of 
the payment is paid in the first year, 20% in the second year, 15% in the third, 10% in the fourth, 
and 5% in the fifth. These contracts call for participants to continue with the agreed land use for 
15 years, a restriction that is written into the land title so that it transfers to the new buyer should 
the land be sold.  
The establishment of trustworthy contract monitoring and verification systems is an 
important part of any system of payments. Monitoring is undertaken primarily by the agencies 
responsible for contracting with farmers, including SINAC, FUNDECOR, and the regentes, with 
regular audits to verify the accuracy of monitoring. With the financial support of the Ecomarkets 
Project, FONAFIFO has established a state-of-the-art database to track compliance. Non-
complying participants forfeit further payments. Regentes who incorrectly certify compliance 
can lose their license. 
There are no specific contract conditions to prevent participants from clearing one area 
even as they enroll another in the PSA Program, though the ban on clearing would apply. The 
risk of indirect leakage seems limited. Despite the size of the PSA Program, it does not appear to 
have had significant economy-wide impacts (Ross et al., 2006). 
Impact of the PSA program 
The PSA program has been very popular with landowners, with requests to participate far 
outstripping available financing. Figure 1 shows the area enrolled under each contract type since 
1998. At the end of 2005, about 270,000ha were enrolled in the program. Forest conservation has 
consistently been the most popular contract, accounting for 91% of the area covered since 1998, 
and for 95% of enrolled area at the end of 2005. Forest plantation accounts for 5% of total area 
(4% at end 2005) and sustainable forest management (now discontinued) for 4% of total area 
(1% at end 2005). The new agroforestry contract does not yet account for a significant area. 
PES programs can suffer from various kinds of inefficiency (Pagiola, forthcoming): 
Offering payments that are insufficient to induce adoption of socially-desirable land uses, thus 
causing socially-undesirable land uses to remain in use. 
Inducing the adoption of socially-undesirable land uses, that supply environmental services, but 
at a cost higher than the value of the services. 
Paying for adoption of practices that would have been adopted anyway. 
The first two problems result in social inefficiency: in either the failure to adopt practices whose 
social benefits exceed their costs, or in the adoption of practices whose benefits are smaller than 
                                                 
15   There are two minor exceptions to this: a higher payment in the Río Segundo watershed, and a lower payment 
to landowners without title in the Río Platanar watershed (see notes to Table 1).    9  
their costs. In both cases, social welfare is reduced over what it might have been. The third 
problem is not one of social inefficiency: the practices adopted are in fact socially efficient. 
Rather, this problem is one of financial efficiency for the program, which is generating less 
environmental services per dollar spent than if the problem was avoided. It can result in social 
inefficiency, however, in cases where funds for PES are limited: payments to land uses that 
would have been adopted anyway reduce funds available to induce socially-efficient land use 
change elsewhere. It can also result in social inefficiency if transaction costs are high, as these 
costs are not offset by any benefits. 
The type and size of payments provided by a PES program affect the likelihood of these 
problems arising. Costa Rica’s PSA program offers a relatively low, undifferentiated, and mostly 
un-targeted payment. Thus it will only tend to attract participants whose opportunity cost of 
participation is low, or negative. Such a program is very likely to experience the first type of 
problem, in which socially-desirable land use practices are not adopted because the payment 
offered is insufficient. Being undifferentiated and untargeted, the program will also attract many 
land users who would have adopted the desired practices anyway (third problem). The relatively 
low payments mean, however, that the program is unlikely to induce the adoption of socially-
inefficient land uses on a significant scale (second problem).  
Has the program affected forest cover? 
The forest area enrolled in the PSA program at the end of 2005 represented about 10% of 
the country’s forest area. This high percentage, coupled with the country’s success at reversing 
deforestation trends, makes it tempting to attribute the one to the other.  
In principle, increasing the returns to forest
16 should induce a greater supply of forest. At 
the margin, landowners with forest areas will be less likely to clear it while landowners without 
forest will be more inclined to allow forest to regenerate.
17 Thus the forest conservation contract 
could either help avoid deforestation, or help induce (or accelerate) forest regeneration. Indeed, it 
can be argued that even non-participants may be induced to change behavior, as the possibility of 
receiving a payment in the future in itself makes forest more attractive (FONAFIFO, 2005), 
though this effect is clearly smaller than that on direct participants. Similarly, the timber 
plantation contract works by making plantations more profitable, and in particular by providing 
financing for initial costs and a revenue stream during part of the period prior to harvest.  
Disentangling the effect of the PSA Program (and its predecessors) from that of other 
policy measures and broader economic trends is difficult, however. The PSA program was 
instituted at the same time as a package of other measures, including a ban on clearing forest 
land. In a sense, the PSA program was a quid pro quo for legal restrictions on clearing. Without 
the PSA carrot, opposition to the legal restrictions might have been much higher. Changes in the 
                                                 
16   It should be noted that PSA participants incur additional obligations compared to non-participants who also 
maintain forest. Although clearing forest is forbidden, up to 40% of standing timber above a certain diameter 
can be harvested. PSA participants give up this right. Hunting is also prohibited in forests receiving PSA 
payments. Regentes are the primary monitoring mechanism for these restrictions. 
17   In principle, only standing forests can be enrolled under the forest conservation contract. A regenerating forest 
would have to be about 5 years old, according to FONAFIFO, to qualify. However, there is anecdotal evidence 
of regenerating forests as young as 2-3 years being enrolled under this contract. Whatever the precise timing, 
this delay reduces the present value of payments relative to opportuntity costs. Uncertainty over whether one’s 
application will be accepted further reduces the expected value of the payment.    10 
profitability of livestock production had also reduced pressure to convert forests to pasture, 
particularly in marginal areas (White et al., 2001, Arroyo-Mora et al., 2005).  
Studies have generally found that PSA recipients have higher forest cover than non-
recipients. Zbinden and Lee (2005) found that PSA recipients in Northern Costa Rica had 61% of 
their farm under forest, compared to only 21% for non-recipients. Likewise, Sierra and Russman 
(2006), found that PSA recipients in the Osa Peninsula had over 92% of their farm under forest 
or bush, compared to 72% for non-recipients. Ortiz and others (2003) find that 36% of a sample 
of 100 PSA participants indicated that forest under conservation contracts had previously been 
used for pasture. These results are not conclusive, however, as they may be due to sample 
selection bias (Sills et al., 2006).  
Ortiz et al. (2003) and Miranda et al. (2003) both found that many PSA participants 
stated they would have protected their forest even in the absence of the PSA Program. That 
FONAFIFO has a long waiting list of applicants willing to enroll at current prices suggests that 
clearing forest is not very profitable in many areas (typically, about three times as much land is 
offered as funds allow for). At the very least, it suggests that FONAFIFO could have enrolled a 
much larger area with the same budget. 
Formal tests of the extent to which the PSA program has affected forest cover have given 
mixed results. Tattenbach et al. (2006) develop an econometric model of gross deforestation 
during the period 1996-2000 using district-level data from the Cordillera Volcanica Central 
Conservation Area (ACCVC). Using their model, they estimate that primary forest cover 
nationwide in 2005 was about 10% greater than it would have been without the PSA Program.
18 
Sills et al. (2006) use a propensity score matching method with farm-level data from Sarapiquí 
from 1997 to 2000 and find evidence that PSA has encouraged protection of mature native forest. 
A separate test using nationwide district-level data gives inconclusive results, however. Finally, 
Pfaff  et al. (2006) find that the PSA Program is likely to have had a minimal impact on 
deforestation during the period 1997-1999. It is difficult to compare these results, however, as 
they apply to different areas, different time periods, different dependent variables, and use 
different methodologies. 
In assessing the incremental land use impact of the PSA program, it should be borne in 
mind that FONAFIFO never set incrementality as an objective. On the contrary, their approach is 
to ‘recognize’ the environmental services of whoever is providing them. If their budget was 
sufficient they would pay any forest owner, as all forests are thought to provide environmental 
services.
19
Have environmental services been generated? 
The PSA Program seeks to generate environmental services solely through forest land 
uses. Indeed, the very definition of environmental services in Forest Law No.7575 is “those that 
forests and plantations provide” (art.3). This is clearly a very blunt approach to environmental 
                                                 
18    A comparison of their estimates of avoided deforestation (108,000ha) to area under contract (270,000 ha) 
suggests that about 38% of forest conservation contracts actually resulted in avoided deforestation. This ratio is 
lowest (13%) in areas of low deforestation risk, and highest (47%) in areas of high deforestation risk. 
19   This is clearly a very blunt approach to environmental services. The Silvopastoral Project, for example, is 
demonstrating that the extent of benefits can vary widely from one land use to another (Ibrahim et al, 2006). 
The MMBIEM will assist FONAFIFO to develop a more differentiated program, with contract terms more 
closely tailored to specific requirements in particular areas.    11 
services. The Silvopastoral Project, for example, is demonstrating that the extent of benefits can 
vary widely from one land use to another (Ibrahim et al, 2006). The introduction of an 
agroforestry contract marks a small move away from pure forest land uses. The MMBIEM will 
assist FONAFIFO to further expand the range of contracts, with supported land use practices 
more closely tailored to specific requirements in particular areas. 
It is unfortunately impossible to determine the extent to which the PSA program has 
successfully generated environmental services. Although the PSA program has established a 
strong system to monitor land user compliance with payment contracts, the program remains 
weak in monitoring its effectiveness in generating the desired services.  
Water services 
Expectations that the PSA program’s would improve water services are based on the 
view, well entrenched in Costa Rica as in most of Central America, that forests are always 
beneficial to water services (Pagiola, 2002; Kaimowitz, 2000). In fact, the evidence on the links 
between land use and water services is far from clear (Bruijnzeel, 2004; Calder, 1999; Chomitz 
and Kumari, 1998; Hamilton and King, 1983), and monitoring has not been undertaken on the 
impact of PSA-supported land uses on the desired water services. The primary concern in Costa 
Rica is over water quality, as quantity is seldom a constraint in a country that receives an 
estimated 170 km
3 of water annually, but consumes about 6 km
3 (AyA and OPS/OMS, 2000; 
FAO, 2000). Quality is particularly important as only 33 of Costa Rica’s 2,069 aqueducts have 
treatment plants, and a further 416 have disinfection plants. Thus the majority of the 1,000 
aqueducts that provide potable water do so because of the quality of the water they are drawing 
upon (Espinoza and others, 2003). Fortunately, the link between forest cover and water quality is 
much better established than that between forest cover and quantity or dry season flow 
(Bruijnzeel, 2004). 
The growing number of contracts with water users (Table 1) indicates that many share the 
common perception of the benefits of forests. Most of these contracts are in watersheds that are 
providing satisfactory levels of water services and where forest cover is still substantially intact. 
Under these conditions, even if the precise link between forests and water services is unknown, a 
strong precautionary principle argument can be made to avoid changes that might threaten the 
situation. Thus the town of Heredia, which does not have a treatment plant, is paying to preserve 
forest cover in its watershed (Castro, 2001). 
It is noteworthy that both the water service contracts that have come up for renewal have 
been renewed (see Table 1). That two private companies, after five years of experience paying to 
protect the watershed from which they draw their water, have chosen to continue the 
arrangement indicates that they, at least, perceive the program as working.
20 It is also significant 
that more recent contracts with water users have them paying the full cost of conservation in 
their watersheds, plus covering FONAFIFO’s administrative costs, as opposed to the much lower 
contribution that early contracts involved.  
To examine the degree to which existing PSA contracts are likely to contribute to the 
provision of water services, the number of contracts found in hydrologic ally important areas was 
examined. Tattenbach et al. (2006), using data on water use from Fallas (2006), find that 35% of 
the area under forest conservation contracts is in watersheds with downstream surface water 
                                                 
20   Water users may also derive other benefits from participating in the PSA program, such as social peace with 
upstream land users (I. Porras, pers. comm., 2005).     12 
users. Using their estimates of avoided deforestation, they find that 644 million m
3/year of water 
for consumptive uses and 7,224 million m
3/year of water for hydropower production are being 
protected from a deterioration in quality. Thus a substantial part of the program’s resources were 
spent in areas where few water services were likely to be generated. Moreover, only a small part 
of the hydrologic ally important areas was being reached. It should be recalled, however, that 
with the exception of payments based on contracts with individual water users (which only cover 
18,000 ha, see Table 1), hydrological importance has not been a targeting criterion for the PSA 
program to date. 
The water service agreements also indicate that the PSA program is often failing to 
conserve areas that could potentially generate environmental services. As can be seen in Table 1, 
areas conserved tend to fall short of targets—even in watersheds that have now been targeted for 
over five years. Although at the national scale FONAFIFO has more applicants than it can pay 
for, in these watersheds it is unable to find enough applicants, at the current price, to spend the 
budget that water buyers provide. In the Río Segundo area, to overcome high local opportunity 
costs, the PSA program is offering a higher price (US$67/ha, compared to the usual US$45) by 
cumulating payments from two local water users, the municipal water supply company of the 
town of Heredia, and bottler Florida Ice & Farm.
21
The pending implementation of the water tariff will result in explicit targeting of 
hydrologic ally important areas, as the decree establishing it specifies that the resources it 
generates must be spent within the same watershed. This will be accompanied by a substantial 
increase in the attention paid to monitoring water impacts. Political support for the tariff could 
quickly evaporate if it comes to be perceived as a tax rather than a means to finance benefits to 
water users. To avoid this, the MMBIEM Project will assist FONAFIFO to develop operational 
guidelines for use of water tariff funds that seek to maximize their impact on water services, 
including identification of priority watersheds and critical areas within these watersheds, and 
specific interventions required to generate the needed services (which are likely to require the 
introduction of new contract forms). The project will also support the establishment of a 
monitoring system that will allow FONAFIFO to demonstrate to water users the benefits they are 
receiving, or to adjust responses in the watershed, in the event results fall short. 
Biodiversity conservation services 
As with water services, the percentage of enrolled area located in biodiversity 
conservation priority area provides a crude indicator of effectiveness at providing biodiversity 
services. Table 2 shows the area under conservation contracts located in biodiversity 
conservation priority areas.
22 The results here depend on the definition of biodiversity priority 
area used. Using the narrower definition of the original GRUAS report, about 30% of active 
contracts at the end of 2005 were in biodiversity priority areas. Using the expanded definition 
adopted in 2003, about 59% of active contracted area at the end of 2005 was in biodiversity 
priority areas. An additional 39,000 ha (3% of active contracted area) was inside protected areas, 
                                                 
21   This joint payment also demonstrates that PES agreements can be reached in watersheds with multiple water 
users. Securing payments from water users is particularly difficult in such cases, as each individual user has an 
incentive to free-ride. For another example of multiple water users sharing the cost of a PES program, see 
Echevarría (2002). 
22   A 1996 evaluation (the “GRUAS Report”) defined biodiversity conservation priorities on a countrywide basis; 
it was later updated. It provides the primary basis for defining priority areas in the PSA Program. In addition, 
priority biodiversity corridors were defined under the Ecomarkets Project, and others by SINAC. They are also 
considered priority areas for the PSA Program, as are remaining private lands within protected areas.     13 
and thus also in biodiversity priority areas. The proportion of contracted areas within the 
expanded definition has increased markedly since 2003, when FONAFIFO took over the 
application process from SINAC and made concerted efforts to target contract allocation. Using 
a slightly different definition of biodiversity priority areas, Tattenbach et al. (2006) get a similar 
result: in 2005, about 65% of PSA conservation contracts were in biodiversity priority areas.  
With most contracts being for forest conservation, incremental impacts on biodiversity in 
enrolled areas depend largely on whether the program is achieving an incremental change in land 
cover. Using their model of avoided deforestation, Tattenbach et al. (2006) estimate that the PSA 
Program prevented the loss of 72,000 ha of forests in biodiversity priority areas between 1999 
and 2005. The new agroforestry modality, though it only represents a small area to date, looks 
likely to have a significant impact on biodiversity in agricultural landscapes. The Silvopastoral 
Project has been documenting that land use practices with significant tree cover harbor higher 
levels of biodiversity than current tree-less pastures (Ibrahim et al., 2006). The number of 
observed diversity of bird species, as well as the number of individuals, is higher in land uses 
with trees, and higher yet when the tree density is higher. 
Carbon sequestration services 
The extent of carbon sequestration services the PSA Program has generated is driven 
primarily by avoided deforestation, and so cannot be estimated without better estimates of actual 
land use impact. Tattenbach et al. (2006), using their model of avoided deforestation and an 
estimate of 100tC/ha, estimate that the PSA Program avoided the emission of 11 million tC 
between 1999 and 2005. 
How permanent are the benefits? 
The long-term sustainability of land use changes promoted by the PSA program, and of 
any environmental services they generate, is hard to assess at present, because only the earliest 
contracts undertaken under the PSA have expired. In the case of forest conservation contracts—
the vast majority of contracts agreed with landowners—there is no expectation of sustainability 
unless the contracts are renewed. Without continuing payments, landowners would clearly no 
longer have additional incentives to continue conserving forests.
23 FONAFIFO does intend to 
renew these contracts, to the extent that resources allow, except in cases where contracts were 
outside priority areas. In the case of plantation contracts, the expectation is that landowners will 
continue with the agreed land use even after payments cease. Indeed, this is a legal requirement 
under the contract. The reasoning here is that the PSA payment helped landowners finance the 
initial costs of establishing plantations, converting what would have been an unprofitable 
investment into a profitable one. However, reports from the field indicate that most landowners 
find it very difficult to maintain plantations because they do not generate any revenue in the 
interval between the end of the PES (in year 5) and the harvest of the timber (typically in year 
20). In attempt to address this problem, both the amount and the duration of payments (to 10 
years) under the forest plantation contracts were increased beginning in 2006.  
The more important factor in the sustainability of the program is the sustainability of the 
income streams that FONAFIFO receives to make payments to land users. In this regard, it is 
                                                 
23   It is important to stress that what matters is the duration of the payment, not the duration of the contract. A 
contract that last relatively few years before being renewed is in many ways attractive as it permits a periodic 
adjustment of the terms of the contract and a re-assessment of the usefulness of contracting in specific areas. It 
should also be recalled that clearing forest is illegal.    14 
worrying that the energy tax revenue is FONAFIFO’s only substantial long-term income stream, 
as this may be threatened in the future if rising energy prices lead to pressure to reduce the tax. 
Individual agreements with water users are a sustainable income stream, and in this sense it is 
particularly encouraging that both contracts that came up for renewal to date have in fact been 
renewed. These payments, however, so far only represent a small portion of total funding.  
The new water tariff will change this outlook, by providing a substantial additional 
income stream—an income stream that, moreover, is likely to be highly sustainable over time as 
long as the PSA program can demonstrate that it is indeed generating water services. Once fully 
implemented, the water tariff will provide about US$5 million a year to FONAFIFO. Carbon 
financing will also provide a reasonably long-term income stream for activities eligible under the 
Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism.
24 As noted, an initial sale of 0.61 million 
tCO2e has been made to World Bank’s BioCarbon Fund. FONAFIFO hopes to generate about 
US$1 million a year from carbon sales by 2012.  
The missing element in the long-term funding picture is biodiversity-specific funding. 
Both water fee revenues and carbon funding sources have restrictions (water fees can only be 
used in the watersheds where they are generated, carbon funding can only be used for 
reforestation), which would leave many areas that are important for biodiversity conservation 
with insufficient financing. The GEF grant under the Ecomarkets Project provided biodiversity-
specific funding, but that funding has now ceased. Likewise, funds from contracts with CI are 
finite in time. To help assure sustainable, long-term financing of its activities in areas where 
water and carbon payments will be insufficient, FONAFIFO established a Biodiversity 
Conservation Trust Fund (Fondo para la Biodiversidad Sostenible, FBS) with the assistance of 
the Ecomarkets Project. This fund will receive initial capitalization from a GEF grant under the 
MMBIEM Project, and also serve as the repository of other grants, and of income from sales of 
conservation certificates in the voluntary market.
25
Does the PSA program benefit the poor? 
Although PES programs like Costa Rica’s PSA are not designed to be a poverty reduction 
program, the frequently high spatial correlation between areas that supply environmental services 
and poor areas create opportunities for PES to contribute to this objective (Pagiola et al., 2005). 
Studies of the biological corridors targeted for GEF-financed payments under the Ecomarkets 
program—some of which overlap with watersheds targeted by water service payments—found 
them to be among the poorest areas in Costa Rica (World Bank, 2000). In recent years, 
                                                 
24   That is, for reforestation and afforestation in areas deforested prior to 1990. FONAFIFO has identified about 1.1 
million ha of ‘Kyoto Lands’ in Costa Rica. 
25   There is a small but growing market for voluntary contributions to conservation. This market does not depend 
on either legal obligation (as in the case of firms needing to buy carbon emissions to comply with obligations, 
or water users being obligated to pay the new water fees)  nor self-interest (as in the case of the water users that 
have signed contracts with FONAFIFO to finance the conservation of the watersheds from which they draw 
their water). Rather, this market depends largely on the personal ethical/moral choices or individual tastes, or on 
the desire for favorable publicity. Thus, many individuals and firms seek to offset the impact of their own 
carbon emissions even when they are under no obligation to do so. See Tipper (2002) for an example of a 
conservation project financed by sales of carbon emissions reductions to the ‘retail’ (non-Kyoto) market. This is 
not a huge market, but neither is it negligible. Costa Rica’s strong ‘brand name’ in environmental conservation 
and FONAFIFO’s track record mean that FONAFIFO is are well positioned to tap into this market. As noted, 
FONAFIFO has already made some forays into selling carbon emission reductions to the ‘retail’ market. It is 
also exploring options for selling ‘biodiversity conservation’ in this market.    15 
FONAFIFO has sought to maximize their poverty impact by adding particularly disadvantaged 
districts to the priority areas for the PSA Program. The MMBIEM Project will also include a 
component specifically targeted at supporting the participation of poorer landholders in the 
program. 
The evidence on the impact of the PSA Program on the poor to date has been mixed. 
Several studies (Ortiz et al., 2003; Miranda et al., 2003; Zbinden and Lee, 2005) have found that 
the bulk of program benefits tend to go to larger and relatively better-off farmers. Conversely, 
Muñoz (2004) finds that the PSA Program plays an important role in the livelihood of poor land 
holders in the Osa Peninsula. 
A specific problem that affected the participation of the poor early in the PSA program 
was lack of titles. In general, titles may not be necessary for participation in a PES program as 
long as tenure is secure (Pagiola and Platais, forthcoming). Titles did emerge as an issue in Costa 
Rica, however, as national law forbade using public funds to pay landowners who lacked formal 
title. This not only prevented many of the poor from participating—as they were more likely to 
lack titles than better-off farmers—but it also impeded the effective functioning of the program 
by restricting participation in several important areas (Pagiola, 2002). When FONAFIFO is 
administering private funds, however, the legal restrictions do not apply. The solution, therefore, 
was to create parallel contracts, similar in all respects to the PSA contract, but financed entirely 
with funds provided by the service buyers, as was done Río Platanar (see Table 1). More 
recently, the law was changed to allow participation of landowners that lack titles. 
Transaction costs are often an important impediment to participation of the poor, as 
working with many small, dispersed farmers imposes high transaction costs. Initially, the PSA 
program imposed very high transaction costs on participants, requiring applicants to fulfill 
eleven separate requirements, many of which—such as providing proof of payment of local taxes 
and that they do not owe anything to national health system—had nothing to do with their ability 
to provide environmental services (Miranda et al., 2003). These requirements have since been 
substantially reduced, by linking FONAFIFO’s databases to those of other government agencies. 
Being current on social security payments is still a requirement, but this is now checked 
automatically. The PSA program also developed mechanisms to overcome the obstacles that 
transaction costs can create to participation by the poor. A system of collective contracting 
(contratos globales) was developed through which groups of small farmers joined the PSA 
program collectively rather than individually, thus spreading transaction costs over a large group 
(FONAFIFO, 2000). This approach ran into problems, however, as non-compliance by a single 
group member resulted in payments being halted to all members. The approach has thus been 
revised to process the applications of such groups together, but then issue individual contracts; 
this avoids the partial compliance problem, but has much smaller savings in transaction costs. 
Some have argued that by making land more valuable, PES could result in politically 
powerful groups muscling out poorer land users who lack secure tenure (Landell-Mills and 
Porras, 2002). There is anecdotal evidence that this has happened in Colombia’s Cauca Valley, 
for example. Conversely, Costa Rica’s PSA program has been said to improve tenure security by 
preventing land kept under forest being considered ‘idle’ and providing protection against land 
invasions (Miranda et al., 2003).    16 
Conclusions 
Costa Rica’s PSA program has been one of the conservation success stories of the last 
decade. Its approach has been widely studied, and to an increasing degree imitated. FONAFIFO 
has hosted dozens of official delegations from countries throughout the world who have come to 
study the PSA program. Mexico has established a formal PSA programs inspired, in part, by 
Costa Rica’s example (Muñoz et al., forthcoming). As this paper has noted, however, the PSA 
program has many weaknesses, and it is as important to learn from its mistakes as it is to learn 
from its successes.  
By building on the basis of previous forest subsidy schemes, Costa Rica was able to 
develop an elaborate, nationwide system of payments for environmental services relatively 
rapidly. As discussed, however, this was not without drawbacks. Many of the details of the 
previous schemes which were carried over into the PSA program were sub-optimal from the 
perspective of generating services—notably the lack of targeting and the use of undifferentiated 
payments. With experience, many of these weaknesses are being gradually corrected. The PSA 
program is evolving towards a much more targeted program, a trend that will be accelerated by 
the introduction of the new water tariff and by efforts to secure carbon financing. These same 
trends are also forcing the development of new approaches and the use of more differentiated 
payments, to allow for differences in both the level of service provision and the opportunity cost 
of providing services.  
The other major weakness in the PSA program is its lack of data on the extent to which 
its activities are, in fact, generating environmental services. Only the GEF-supported 
silvopastoral project has monitored its impact on biodiversity conservation and carbon 
sequestration. The efficiency and long-term sustainability of the program demand that 
understanding of how different land use practices contribute to generating environmental 
services be substantially improved. In particular, demonstrating carbon sequestration is a sine 
qua non of participation in the emerging global carbon market. Work is currently underway in 
this area, including one-time studies of the impact of different land uses on services and the 
establishment of long-term monitoring systems. 
As the first effort to develop a large-scale PES program in a developing country,
26 it was 
inevitable that there would be mistakes in Costa Rica’s PSA program. There was no instruction 
manual, and many of the issues involved were only dimly perceived. Even today, with much 
more experience in this area, there remains much to learn before we can confidently make 
recommendations on how such programs should be designed. We do not yet have all the 
answers, but we believe we have most of the questions (Pagiola and Platais, forthcoming). 
Perhaps the most important lesson that might be learned from the Costa Rica experience is the 
need to be flexible and to adapt to lessons learned and to changing circumstances. 
 
                                                 
26    There are earlier examples of PES approaches, notably in Colombia’s Cauca Valley (Pagiola and Platais, 
forthcoming; Echevarría, 2002) but they were on a much smaller scale.    17 
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 Table 1: Contracts for provision of water services in Costa Rica’s PSA program  




















  Comments 
Energía Global  Hydropower 
producer 
Río Volcán and 
Río San 
Fernando 
2,000 1,493  12  0 
Signed 1997, renewed 2002 
Platanar S.A.  Hydropower 
producer 





5% of payment  Signed 1999, renewed 2004; addendum on 
non-titled land users signed 2000 for 10 
yrs 
CNFL  Río Aranjuez   4,000  2,424  40 




Río Laguna Cote  900  501  40 
$13/ha yr 1 
$7/ha yrs 2-5 
Umbrella agreement signed 2000, with 
addendums covering specific watersheds 
Florida Ice & Farm  Bottler  Río Segundo  45
d $29/ha yr 1  Signed 2001, later modified to use CSA 





d $4/ha yr 1  Signed 2002 using CSA 




550  0  45  7%  Signed 2004 using CSA 



















Río Aguas Zarcas  1,666  0  30  7%  Signed 2005 using CSA 
Desarrollos Hoteleros 
Guanacaste 
Tourism Acuífero  de 
Guanacaste 
925  0  45  7%  Signed 2005 using CSA 
Notes:  a. In cases where contracts have been renewed, information shown on area covered and payment is that under the latest contract. 
  b. Participating land users receive the standard PSA contract payments (currently US$42/ha/yr) except in Río Segundo (see below) 
  c. Platanar pays US$15/ha/yr for contracts with landowners with land titles (285ha at end 2004), with FONAFIFO paying the rest; It pays US$30/ha/yr for 
contracts with landowners without land titles (385ha at end 2004), who are not otherwise eligible for PSA contracts 
  d. To overcome high local opportunity costs, payments by Florida Ice & Farm and Heredia ESPH are cumulated, so that land users are paid US$67/ha/yr 
Source: FONAFIFO  data    
Table 2: PSA contracts in biodiversity conservation priority areas, by year of signing 






management Total  
% of total 







Contracts inside GRUAS areas 
1999 13,560 159  1,181  14,900 23.4   1.7  
2000 7,400  185  0  7,585 27.2   0.9  
2001 6,604  212  394  7,211 20.8   0.8  
2002 3,136  145  563  3,844 13.9   0.4  
2003 27,664 541 0  28,205 40.3   3.2  
2004 24,243 550 0  24,793 29.8   2.8  
2005 15,369 447 0  15,817 28.4   1.8  
Total 97,977  2,240  2,138  102,355    
Current  957  77,017  1,896  79,870   29.5   9.0  
Contracts inside GRUAS areas, plus Ecomarkets and SINAC corridors 
1999 2,844  25,385  464  28,693   45.1   1.5  
2000 43  12,373  777  13,193   47.3   0.7  
2001 666  13,958  452  15,076   43.4   0.8  
2002 1,760  7,432  533  9,726   35.2   0.5  
2003 0  45,356  1,379  46,735   66.7   2.4  
2004 0  52,332  1,473  53,804   64.8   2.8  
2005 0  33,199  932  34,131   61.3   1.8  
Total 5,313  190,034  6,011  201,359     
Current  2,426  152,277  4,770  159,473   58.8   8.2  
Notes:  Current contracts are active contracts at end of 2005. 
Source:  FONAFIFO data.  


















Source: FONAFIFO data 
 